

Making Sense of Cyber Capabilities for Small States

Stratbase ADR Institute

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Francis C. Domingo

Department of International Studies

De La Salle University

Scope of Lecture

1. Context
2. Puzzle and argument
3. Theory and method
3. Analysis
4. Implications

Context: Cyber Operations




Espionage

(Gartzke et al., 2012; Harkett et al, 2022)




Sabotage

Rid, 2013; Rovner 2022




Subversion

(Buchanan, 2020; Maschmeyer, 2021)



Cyber incidents: 20



Cyber incidents: 18



Cyber incidents: 23



Cyber incidents: 21



Cyber incidents : 28



Cyber incidents: 13



Cyber incidents: 17

Context: Regional Rivalries

Reference: Valeriano et al. (2018)

Context: Actors

Sponsor	Method	Motivation
State	vandalism, DDoS, intrusion, infiltration	intelligence collection, disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure
Criminals	crime	monetary gain
Activists	vandalism, DDoS	political protests to challenge the status quo
Hackers	vandalism, DDoS	bragging rights in the hacker community; thrill of challenge
Disgruntled insiders	intrusion, infiltration	damage and disrupt an organization
*Terrorists	intrusion, infiltration	destroy, disable, or exploit critical infrastructures

Reference: Reveron, et al. (2012); Valeriano et al. (2015)

Puzzle and Argument

Why do small states develop cyber capabilities despite its obscure strategic value?



**Neoclassical
Realism**


Systemic Level
Distribution of power




State Level
*Technology-oriented" strategic
culture*

Theory: Neoclassical Realism

Variables of Neoclassical Realism




Conceptual framework



Applied framework



Data Collection



Data Analysis: Comparative Method

- ✓ “Smallness” (population, foreign policy, military)
- ✓ Network readiness (use of technology)
- ✓ Cyber capabilities (evidence of cyber operations)
- ✓ Geographic location (Asia-Pacific Region)



Reference: Domingo (2022)


Data Analysis I: Theory Testing

Variables	Themes	Qualitative Indicators
<i>Distribution of power</i>	Great power rivalry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great powers that have interests in the region • Evidence of cyber conflict
	Military expenditures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in military spending • Evidence of expenditures for cyber capabilities
	Arms transfers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in the transfer military weapons • Evidence of cyber capabilities
<i>Strategic culture</i>	Network readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measurement of environment, readiness, usage, and impact of ICT by the WEF
	Relevance of technology for military affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indications of a technology-driven modernisation • Evidence of military upgrades focused on cyber capabilities
	Relevance of cyber security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of cyber threats as a national security issue • Existence of an official strategy for addressing cyber threats

Data Analysis I: Theory Testing

Variables	Themes	Qualitative Assessment
<i>Distribution of power</i>	Great power rivalry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (affected) • New Zealand (affected) • Brunei (affected)
	Military expenditures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (high) • New Zealand (low) • Brunei (low)
	Arms transfers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (high) • New Zealand (low) • Brunei (low)
<i>Strategic culture</i>	Network readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (high) • New Zealand (moderate) • Brunei (low)
	Relevance of technology for military affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (high) • New Zealand (moderate) • Brunei (low)
	Relevance of cyber security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Singapore (high) • New Zealand (high) • Brunei (moderate)

Data Analysis II: Assessing Cyber Capabilities



Extreme	Traditional	Network-enabled
	Military action (war, deterrence, compellence)	Military action (cyber deterrence, cyber compellence)
	Political Interventions (sabotage, subversion)	Political Interventions (“cyber sabotage”, hacktivism)
	Negative sanctions (boycotts, embargoes, laser sanctions, restrictions on cultural contacts)	Negative sanctions (no equivalent)
	Positive sanctions (aid, trade agreements, public diplomacy)	Positive sanctions (no equivalent)
Routine	Diplomacy (discussions/negotiations)	Diplomacy (digital diplomacy)

Table 5: Traditional and networked-enabled foreign policy

Data Analysis II: Assessing Cyber Capabilities

	Diplomacy	Negative Sanctions	Positive Sanctions	Political Intervention	Military Action
Singapore	Useful	No equivalent	No equivalent	Useful	Useful
New Zealand	Useful	No equivalent	No equivalent	Not useful	Not useful
Brunei	Useful	No equivalent	No equivalent	Not useful	Not useful

Implications for the Region

- 1. Normality of cyber conflict.** Low-level cyber conflict is likely to be an enduring feature of state interactions in the region
- 2. Cyber evolution.** Network technologies have an evolutionary (not revolutionary) impact on the strategy and foreign policies of small states in the region
- 3. Public-private partnerships.** Importance of developing public private partnerships in addressing cyber security issues

Implications for the Philippines

- 1. Strategy.** Building on the *National Cybersecurity Plan 2022* is crucial for strengthening the defense posture of the Philippines
- 2. Diplomacy.** Cyber diplomacy is necessary tool for less powerful states with limited resources
- 3. Capability.** Leveraging the Philippine-U.S. alliance in enhancing the capacity for cyber operations

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Thank you for your attention.



Contact

francis.domingo@dlsu.edu.ph

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